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In this study I examine how a firm’s exposure to political risk affects its merger & 
acquisition (M&A) activities. Consistent with the predictions from real options theory, I find 
that a firm is less likely to engage in M&A activities and less likely to take large M&A deals 
when its exposure to political risk is high. This effect is particularly evident when acquirers are 
taking diversified M&As or when acquirers are influential and dominant in their industry. I 
also find a positive relationship between the time to deal completion and the acquirer’s 
exposure to political risk. Additionally, given that prudence and conservatism are motivated 
by a higher-level of political risk, I show that this leads to acquirers paying lower bid premiums 





I certify that this work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of 
any other degree or diploma in my name, in any university or other tertiary institution and, to 
the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by 
another person, except where due reference has been made in the text. In addition, I certify that 
no part of this work will, in the future, be used in a submission in my name, for any other 
degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution without the prior approval of 
the University of Adelaide and where applicable, any partner institution responsible for the 
joint-award of this degree.  
I give permission for the digital version of my thesis to be made available on the web, 
via the University’s digital research repository, the Library Search and also through web search 
engines, unless permission has been granted by the University to restrict access for a period of 
time.  
I acknowledge the support I have received for my research through the provision of an 






                                                                         




First, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my supervisors, Professor Ralf-
Yves Zurbrugg, Dr. Limin Xu, and Dr. Juan Luo, for their invaluable guidance and 
considerable encouragement through my MPhil study. Without their persistent help, this thesis 
would not have been possible. It was a great privilege and honour to study and work under 
their supervision. I am also extremely grateful to the insightful comments from Associate 
Professor Jean Canil, and Dr. Chia-Feng Yu at my CCSP presentation. In addition, I thank 
Professor Alfred Yawson for his precious assistance and scholarly knowledge during the 
process of completing my MPhil coursework study. Last but not least, I wish to thank my 




1. Introduction  
The business operating environment is significantly affected by the political decisions 
made by regulatory institutions and politicians. Recent events, such as the escalation in the 
United States-China trade war, have intensified the concerns about risks emanating from the 
political system and different political decisions. Since businesses face a significant amount of 
uncertainty regarding the timing, content, and potential influence from political decisions, it is 
essential to understand what consequences political risks may cause, and the magnitude of such 
effects (Hassan et al. (2019)). These topics have recently attracted growing attention from 
politicians, business leaders and researchers.  
Many researchers in finance examine the impact of policy uncertainty on various 
corporate activities. Prior literature suggests that a higher level of aggregate policy uncertainty 
is associated with a lower level of corporate investment (Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016), 
Gulen and Ion (2016)). According to real options theory, Gulen and Ion (2016) argue that 
uncertainty shocks increase the value of real options. Firms tend to delay investment, especially 
for irreversible investment, to preserve the value of real options (Bernanke (1983), Abel and 
Eberly (1994), Lang and Stulz (1994)). Thus, firms scale back spending when policy 
uncertainty is high.  
Using the aggregate economic policy uncertainty index, Baker, Bloom, and Davis 
(2016) further confirm the real options channel through which policy uncertainty negatively 
affects corporate investment. Merger and acquisition (M&A) is one of the most important 
corporate investment decisions. With an estimated aggregate volume of over $4 trillion in 2018 
(Monica (2018)), M&As are among the largest and most readily observable forms of corporate 
investment. Nguyen and Phan (2017) and Bonaime, Gulen, and Ion (2018) show that firms’ 
M&A activities are negatively associated with the aggregate level of policy uncertainty. As 
M&As are considered as risky and irreversible investment, firms become cautious and tend to 
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delay such investment when facing policy uncertainty. Further, Nguyen and Phan (2017) find 
a positive association between policy uncertainty and M&A performance. Such a positive 
impact on M&As comes from a better selection process of the target firms and better 
acquisition terms due to a higher level of policy uncertainty.  
While these studies highlight the relationship between policy uncertainty and M&A 
activity, they only focus on the aggregate level of political risk. However, individual firms 
could have different levels of exposure to political risk and aggregate policy uncertainty 
(Hassan et al. (2019)). To address this issue, Hassan et al. (2019) develop a firm-level political 
risk index. Hassan et al. (2019) find that over 90% of the variation in firm-level political risk 
is not caused by the aggregate policy uncertainty, which highlights the importance of 
considering firm-level political risk in future research. Moreover, they also find that firms with 
a high level of political risk are associated with significant decrease in investment and capital 
expenditures.  
However, little is known about how firm-specific political risk affects M&A activities. 
In the context of M&As, policy uncertainty is an important source of risk as it can lead to 
uncertainty about the valuation of the target firm and deal synergies (Bonaime, Gulen, and Ion 
(2018)). Therefore, it is necessary to explore the relationship between firm-level political risk 
and M&A activity. My study fills this gap by examining the effect of political risk faced by 
individual firms on their M&A activities. This extension of literature is meaningful, given the 
limitation of the aggregate level policy uncertainty index and the importance of M&As in 
corporate investment.  
In particular, my study examines the effects of firm-level political risk on acquisition 
likelihood, deal value, the time it takes to complete the deal, deal premiums, and deal 
performance for firms in the United States from 2003 to 2017. The measure of firm-level 
political risk is from Hassan et al. (2019), which utilize the transcripts of quarterly conference-
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call and the computational linguistics to quantify the share of the earnings call devoted to 
discussing risks associated with politics. Furthermore, they also identify risks associated with 
different political topics, such as health care, economic policy and so on.  
I begin my analysis by estimating the effect of firm-level political risk on the probability 
of conducting M&As. From the real options perspective, when the level of policy uncertainty 
is high, firms are more likely to delay investment, especially the irreversible investment (Abel 
(1983), Dixit, Dixit, and Pindyck (1994)). As M&A activity is typically considered as a large 
and difficult to-reverse investment (Nguyen and Phan (2017)), I predict that there is a negative 
relationship between a firm’s exposure to political risk and its likelihood of making 
acquisitions.   
Using a logit model, I regress a firm’s probability to engage in an M&A deal in year 
t+1 on the political risk that the firm is facing in year t, and firm-level control variables in year 
t. Based on 42,004 firm-year observations, I find that firm-level political risk is negatively 
associated with the probability of conducting M&As. This finding is consistent with the 
previous literature, which examines the effects of national wide political risk (Nguyen and 
Phan (2017), Bonaime, Gulen, and Ion (2018), Cao, Li, and Liu (2019)). In my study, I am able 
to show that the firm-level idiosyncratic political risk also yields a negative impact on M&A 
probability, further supporting the real options theory.  
Next, I examine the effect of political risk on the deal size of M&As. As a higher level 
of policy uncertainty results in a lower level of corporate investment (Baker, Bloom, and Davis 
(2016), Hassan et al. (2019)), firms tend to reduce capital spending for M&As and conduct 
smaller deals when their exposure to political risk is high. Using the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) model, I regress the total deal value in year t+1 on the firm-level political risk and 
control for other firm-specific characteristics in year t. The empirical result suggests a negative 
relationship between deal size and firm political risk.  
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The impact of policy uncertainty on corporate acquisitions may vary depending on the 
types of political risk. Thus, I use the topic-specific political risk measure developed by Hassan 
et al. (2019) to further explore the effects of different types of political risk on corporate M&A 
behaviour. Among the eight different topics, I find that political risk related to economic policy 
and budget, environment, trade, and tax has a significant negative effect on M&A likelihood 
and deal value. In contrast, the risk associated with institutions and political process, health 
care, security and defence, and technology and infrastructure does not have a meaningful 
impact on M&A activity.  
Additionally, I examine whether the negative effect of firm-level political risk on M&A 
activities is dependent on the type of acquisition deals. Diversified M&As are risky investment, 
which are usually viewed negatively by the market (Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek 
(1995), Scharfstein (1998)). Risk-averse managers tend to avoid such risky investment when 
policy uncertainty is high (Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012)). Thus, the negative relationship 
between political risk and M&A activities should be stronger for diversified M&As. Consistent 
with this prediction, the empirical results show that the negative impacts of political risk on 
firm acquisitiveness and M&A deal value are mainly driven by the decrease in the diversified 
M&As. I further perform the subsample analysis based on the market share of a firm. As large 
and influential firms have more political connections, they are more likely to be affected by 
the political risk (An et al. (2016)). Using the market share of a firm within its operating 
industry to proxy for its influence, I find that only industry-dominated firms reduce the 
corporate acquisition likelihoods and M&A deal value when their exposures to political risk is 
high.  
Using the sample of 4,635 completed M&As, I further examine the relationship 
between firm-level political risk and the time it takes to complete the deal. Based on the real 
options theory, high uncertainty increases firms' incentives to delay investment until some of 
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the uncertainty resolves (Abel (1983), Dixit, Dixit, and Pindyck (1994)), which also implies 
that it will be better for firms to spend more time during the deal negotiation periods. Using 
the OLS regressions, I find that that a firm’s exposure to political risk is positively correlated 
with the time it takes to complete M&A deals, which is consistent with this hypothesis. 
Further, the existing literature argues that firms become more prudent when the political 
risk is high (Rodrik (1991), Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen (2007), Gulen and Ion (2016)). 
Thus, if firms choose to conduct M&As when exposing to a high level of policy uncertainty, 
they would select the acquisition target carefully and be prudent about the terms of the 
acquisition (Nguyen and Phan (2017)). This proposition indicates that firms’ exposure to 
political risk is negatively related to the bid premiums and positively associated with the deal 
performance.   
To test this prediction, first, I regress the bid premiums on firm-level political risk while 
controlling the firm and deal characteristics. The empirical result suggests a negative 
relationship between firm-level political risk and bid premiums, which is consistent with our 
prediction that acquirers’ exposure to political risk induces them to be more conservative in 
setting the bid prices. Next, I examine how acquirers’ exposure to political risk influences the 
short-term performance of acquisitions. To measure the short-term performance of M&As, I 
calculate the three-day and the seven-day cumulative abnormal stock returns around M&A 
announcements (CARs). The regression results reveal that the stock market reacts positively 
to the M&A announcements if acquirers’ political risk is high. This positive association 
between market response and acquirers’ exposure to policy uncertainty indicates that the M&A 
deals conducted by acquirers with high political risk create value for shareholders.  
Last, I examine the relationship between long-term performance and acquirers’ 
exposure to political risk. Consistent with the previous results, acquirers’ political risk is 
positively related to their long-term performance, measured as the 3-years’ industry-adjusted 
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sales growth following the acquisition announcements. In addition, I also examine how 
acquirers’ political risk affects their changes in industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA) after 
the M&As using a propensity-score matched sample. Both findings demonstrate that political 
risk motivates the acquirers to perform due diligence in screening the targets and select the 
right M&A deals that improves firm performance in the long term.  
It is possible that both the firm-level political risk and M&As activities are correlated 
with some unobservable factors, such as the investment opportunities. To address the 
possibility that an omitted variable bias exists in my tests, I perform the instrumental variable 
analysis. Followed by Nguyen and Phan (2017) and Nguyen and Nguyen (2019), I use the 
partisan polarisation measure developed by McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (1997) as an 
instrument for a firm’s exposure to political risk. The empirical results show that the negative 
effect of firm-level political risk on acquisition likelihoods and M&A deal value remains 
statistically significant, which mitigates the concern of an omitted variable bias.  
In sum, my empirical findings show that acquirers become more prudent and tend to 
reduce or delay risky investment when exposing to high policy uncertainty. Thus, firm-level 
political risk is negatively related to the likelihood of conducting M&As and deal value while 
positively associated with the time to completion. Additionally, the acquirer’s prudence due to 
high-level political risk creates value for acquirers. Acquirers are more cautious about setting 
the bid price and selecting the targets, which generates better outcomes.  
My research makes three main contributions to the literature. First, my study adds to 
the literature examining the effects of policy uncertainty on economic outcomes. For example, 
prior literature shows that policy uncertainty affects capital structures (Desai, Foley, and Hines 
Jr (2004), Desai, Foley, and Forbes (2008)), capital expenditures (Julio and Yook (2012), Baker, 
Bloom, and Davis (2016), Gulen and Ion (2016)), bond issuance (Gao, Murphy, and Qi (2019)), 
and equity issuance (Çolak, Durnev, and Qian (2017)). My work adds to the literature by 
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showing that not only country-wide but also firm-specific political risk reduces the probability 
and deal value of M&As. Additionally, this negative effect varies across firms with different 
characteristics. Large and influential firms are more affected by political risk.  
Second, my research contributes to the literature of M&As. Prior work devotes 
significant efforts to understand what factors can affect M&A activities. For instance, product-
market consideration (Hoberg and Phillips (2010)), market valuation (Maksimovic and Phillips 
(2001), Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), Rhodes‐Kropf and Viswanathan (2004)), risk 
management (Garfinkel and Hankins (2011)) and corporate governance issues (Holmstrom and 
Kaplan (2001), Schmidt (2015), Field and Mkrtchyan (2017)) influence M&As. I offer a fresh 
perspective on the determinants of M&As. My research suggests that firm-level political risk, 
especially the political risk related to economic policy and budget, environment, trade, and tax 
policy, negatively affects the probability and the deal value of M&As. The negative effect is 
also dependent on the type of acquisition deals. Diversified M&As are more affected by the 
political risk. Moreover, political risk has value implications. Acquirers with high political risk 
experiences better M&As outcomes.  
Third, my study establishes an important link between the two aforementioned 
literature. The relationship between policy uncertainty and M&As has received growing 
attention. For example, Cao, Li, and Liu (2019) show a significant effect of national elections 
on cross-border mergers. Sha, Kang, and Wang (2020) explore the impact of policy uncertainty 
on M&A deals in China. Using the aggregate policy uncertainty index, Nguyen and Phan (2017) 
and Bonaime, Gulen, and Ion (2018) show that political risk is negatively related to the 
likelihood of conducting M&As and positively associated with the M&A performance 
(Nguyen and Phan (2017)). My research differs from the above papers by focusing on firm-
level political risk. As the aggregate level index can mask much of the firm-level variation in 
political risk (Hassan et al. (2019)), it does not describe the economic impact of political risk 
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completely. Examining the risk at firm-level allows us to consider the firm’s relative position 
in the cross-sectional distribution of political risk, which complements the previous literature.  
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the prior 
literature relevant to the thesis. Section 3 outlines my research questions and key hypotheses. 
Section 4 discusses data, methodology and variables, and reports the summary statistics. 
Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes this study.  
 
2. Literature Review 
This section offers a broad overview of the literature relevant to political risk and 
M&As, including the impact of policy uncertainty on corporate investment and the 
determinants of M&As. The objective is to provide a review of the key theories that are used 
to develop the hypotheses and to identify the research gaps.  
 
2.1 Policy Uncertainty and Corporate Investment 
There is no consensus on the relation between economic uncertainty and corporate 
investment. Assuming perfect competition, some papers document that the output price 
uncertainty could increase corporate investment of risk-neutral firms with constant returns-to-
scale production functions (Hartman (1972), Abel (1983), Caballero (1991)). But, others 
suggest that firms are more likely to delay irreversible investment when uncertainty is high as 
uncertainty increases the value of real options (Bernanke (1983), McDonald and Siegel (1986), 
Abel and Eberly (1994), Dixit, Dixit, and Pindyck (1994), Gulen and Ion (2016)).  
Prior literature devotes significant efforts to understand the impact of policy uncertainty 
on different forms of corporate investment. Using the national election as a proxy for policy 
uncertainty, Julio and Yook (2012) find that firms reduce 4.8% of investment expenditures 
around election years. They argue that firms will delay investment in anticipation of possible 
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changes in the macroeconomic, taxation policy, monetary policies, or the regulatory 
environment. Julio and Yook (2016) further extend this study by examining the election cycle 
and its impact on foreign direct investment. In addition to corporate investment, policy 
uncertainty also affects firms’ financing decisions. For example, during gubernatorial election 
years, firms are less likely to conduct IPOs (Çolak, Durnev, and Qian (2017)) and SEOs (Jens 
(2017)). Based on the real options theory, the value of the option to delay the financing decision 
such as IPOs and SEOs increases due to the higher uncertainty related to gubernatorial elections 
(Çolak, Durnev, and Qian (2017), Jens (2017)).  
With the intensified concerns about the policy uncertainty, Baker, Bloom, and Davis 
(2016) develop an index of economy policy uncertainty (BBD index) for the United States 
since 1985. The BBD index is constructed as a weighted average of three components related 
to newspaper articles, changes in the federal tax code, and the dispersion in forecasts of 
monetary and fiscal policies. The first component relies on ten leading newspapers in the 
United States from January 1985. They obtain a monthly count of articles that contain the 
following terms: “uncertainty” or “uncertain”; “economic” or “economy”; and one of the 
following policy terms: “Congress”, “deficit”, “Federal Reserve”, “legislation”, “regulation”, 
or “White House”. Then, they scale the raw counts by the number of articles in the same 
newspaper that month and standardize the monthly newspaper-level series to unit standard 
deviation. Finally, they average these standardized series across ten papers and normalize to a 
mean of 100 from 1985 to 2009. By applying the newspaper-based approach, they also 
decompose the policy uncertainty measurement into specific policy categories. The second 
component, uncertainty about future changes in the federal tax code, is estimated by the 
discounted dollar value of revenue effects on all tax provisions set to expire over the next ten 
years using the data from the Congressional Budget Office. The last component is measured 
by the dispersion in economic forecasts of government spending and the Consumer Price Index 
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(CPI). The fiscal and monetary policy data are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters.  
The BBD index quantifies the aggregate economic policy uncertainty in the United 
States and is widely used in many recent studies (Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016), Gulen and 
Ion (2016), Nguyen and Phan (2017), Bonaime, Gulen, and Ion (2018)). Baker, Bloom, and 
Davis (2016) show that policy uncertainty is associated with greater stock price volatility. At 
the macro level, a higher level of policy uncertainty results in a lower level of investment, 
production, and employment in the United States. Consistent with their finding, Gulen and Ion 
(2016) argue that policy uncertainty is negatively associated with corporate investment in the 
United States. The mechanism is that policy shocks can increase firms' incentives to delay 
investment due to the higher option values until some of the uncertainty resolves.  
However, all the associations between political risk and firm behaviours outlined above 
focus on the aggregate uncertainty index. Compared to the firm-level measure, the aggregate 
index can mask much of the variation in political risk across different firms. Due to the lack of 
firm-level measure of political risks, most studies ignore the firm-level variation in political 
risk and its economic impacts.  
Recently, to fill the gap in the previous literature, Hassan et al. (2019) develop not only 
a firm-level measure of political risk, but also a flexible decomposition into topic-specific 
components. To achieve this, they use textual analysis of quarterly earnings conference-call 
transcripts of individual firms listed in the United States. They distinguish political topics from 
non-political topics using a pattern-based sequence-classification method developed in 
computational linguistics (Song (2008), Manning, Raghavan, and Schütze (2010)). Using this 
approach, they analyse the transcripts and identify text that is either political in nature or 
indicative of a specific political topic. Similarly, they use the synonyms of the words “risk” 
and “uncertainty” to identify the association with risks. Then, they construct two training 
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libraries, political topic and non-political topic. Each training library is the set of all adjacent 
two-word combinations (“bigrams”) after removing all punctuation. Furthermore, they 
decompose the conference-call transcripts for individual firms in each quarter into a list of 
bigrams. Finally, they count the number of occurrences of bigrams that indicates the discussion 
of a political topic and divide by the total number of bigrams in the transcript to calculate the 
weight. Mirroring this approach, they further distil the training libraries for eight political 
topics: economic policy & budget, environment, trade, institutions & political process, health 
care, security & defence, tax policy, and technology & infrastructure, and calculate the 
corresponding weight.  
Using the firm-level political risk measurement, Hassan et al. (2019) document that a 
large share of the variation in political risk appears to play out at the firm level. Specifically, 
variation in aggregate political risk over time accounts for only 0.81% of the variation in their 
measure, while the firm-level variation contributes to over 90%. Therefore, many of the 
economic outcomes of policy uncertainty are not well documented by conventional models in 
which individual firms are assumed to have similar exposures to aggregate political risk (Baker, 
Bloom, and Davis (2016)).  
Additionally, Hassan et al. (2019) examine the economic effects of firm-level political 
risk. Consistent with Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016), Hassan et al. (2019) find that firms more 
exposed to political risk experience significant increases in the firm-specific stock return 
volatility and decreases in firm’s hiring, investment and planned capital expenditures. Firms 
choose to delay investment to preserve the value of real options. 
Motivated by the limitation in the aggregate level of policy uncertainty documented by 
Hassan et al. (2019), I use the firm-level measurement to capture the firm-level variations in 
political risk. In my study, I explore the economic impact of firm-level political risk on 
corporate investment, in particular, M&As.  
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2.2 Determinants of M&As 
In another strand of literature, M&As is one of the most important forms of corporate 
investment (DePamphilis (2010), Nguyen and Phan (2017)). With an estimated aggregate 
volume of over $4 trillion in 2018 (Monica (2018)), M&As represent the primary and essential 
tools for a company to reallocate capital, expand the existing network and diversify market 
risks. The central focus of M&As research is to understand which factors contribute to M&A 
activity. For example, the existing literature has documented that corporate governance issues 
(Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001), Schmidt (2015), Field and Mkrtchyan (2017)), technology 
considerations (Phillips and Zhdanov (2013), Bena and Li (2014)), and market valuation 
(Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), Rhodes‐Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004)) are important determinants of M&As.  
Uncertainty is one of the key drivers of corporate acquisitions. However, how 
uncertainty affects M&As attracts relatively less attention from researchers. From a risk 
management perspective, Garfinkel and Hankins (2011) find that the increased cash flow 
uncertainty carries significant explanatory power for firms' decisions to vertically integrate. 
They argue that vertical integration is an attempt to hedge cash flow uncertainty. From the 
agency issue perspective, Duchin and Schmidt (2013) show that the high firm-level uncertainty 
during the merger waves increases the agency problem. Therefore, the positive link between 
uncertainty and M&As is motivated by management empire-building. From an interim risk 
perspective, high uncertainty creates a material delay between the initiation of merger 
agreement and the deal completion (Bhagwat, Dam, and Harford (2016)). Given that merger 
renegotiations or terminations entail nontrivial costs to each party (Bates and Lemmon (2003), 
Officer (2004)), greater volatility makes the marginal deal less profitable. Therefore, Bhagwat, 
Dam, and Harford (2016) find that a firm’s stock price uncertainty has a significant dampening 
effect on merger activity.     
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Despite lacking of firm-level variation, the impacts of aggregate policy uncertainty on 
M&As have been examined by Nguyen and Phan (2017), Bonaime, Gulen, and Ion (2018) and 
Sha, Kang, and Wang (2020). Policy uncertainty arises when the future path of government 
policy is uncertain. It includes the uncertainty regarding taxes, government spending, monetary 
and fiscal policy, regulation, and the uncertainty over the electoral outcomes that will influence 
political leadership.  
Utilizing the Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) index, Nguyen and Phan (2017) examine 
the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and M&As in the United States. They 
find that policy uncertainty is negatively associated with the probability of conducting M&As 
and positively related to the time to deal completion. In terms of the deal performance, policy 
uncertainty has a positive impact on the acquirer’s abnormal return around the announcement 
date and acquirer’s long-term performance, measured by buy-and-hold abnormal returns and 
post-merger return on assets. Bonaime, Gulen, and Ion (2018) provide further support for the 
negative relationship between policy uncertainty and firm acquisitiveness. Using four different 
measurements of investment irreversibility, they find that such negative relation is stronger for 
more irreversible deals. Furthermore, using the ten category-specific indices of policy 
uncertainty developed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016), Bonaime, Gulen, and Ion (2018) 
find that uncertainty related to monetary policy, fiscal policy (taxes and government spending), 
and regulation (especially financial regulation) has a significant negative impact on M&A 
activity, while uncertainty regarding health care, national security, trade policy, entitlement 
programs, and sovereign debt does not have a meaningful effect.  
Several studies further examine the impacts of policy uncertainty on international 
M&As or acquisitions outside the United States, such as cross-border acquisitions (Cao, Li, 
and Liu (2019)) and M&A deals in China (Sha, Kang, and Wang (2020)). Cao, Li, and Liu 
(2019) find that acquirers have a higher likelihood of conducting cross-border M&As before a 
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national election. Specifically, acquirers favour target countries that have lower political 
uncertainty or countries that can offset some of the home country's political uncertainty. 
Contradict to the behaviour of firms in the United States, Chinese firms are more likely to make 
acquisitions during the periods of high economic policy uncertainty (Sha, Kang, and Wang 
(2020)). Although firms tend to delay investment under a high-level of uncertainty, the cost of 
waiting in a competitive market is high (Yang and Meyer (2015)). Therefore, facing a high 
level of market competition, firms still choose to conduct M&As to gain a competitive 
advantage in China during the high policy uncertainty period.  
The above two strands of literature show that policy uncertainty does have a real impact 
on corporate behaviours. As political risk is highly volatile and heterogeneous (Hassan et al. 
(2019)), it is important to understand how different exposures to political risk among different 
firms affects their investment decisions. However, no previous study investigates whether the 
variation of political risk at the firm level affects M&A activities. In this paper, I aim to fill this 
gap.   
 
3. Hypothesis Development 
There are two research questions concerning political risk and corporate acquisitions. 
The first one is how firms’ exposure to political risk affects their M&A activities. The second 
one examines whether firms’ exposure to political risk affects the outcomes of their M&As.  
The relationship between uncertainty and corporate investment is unclear. Hartman 
(1972), Abel (1983) and Caballero (1991) argue that uncertainty can increase the corporate 
investment of risk-neutral firms assuming perfect market competition. However, in another 
strand of literature, uncertainty has a negative impact on the corporate investment (Abel and 
Eberly (1994), Dixit, Dixit, and Pindyck (1994), Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajšek (2014), 
Brogaard and Detzel (2015)). Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajšek (2014) argue that uncertainty 
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increases a firm’s cost of capital and default risk, thus, negatively affects corporate investment. 
From a real options perspective, firms tend to delay irreversible investment during periods of 
high uncertainty (Dixit, Dixit, and Pindyck (1994)). By focusing on the policy uncertainty in 
particular, recent studies further confirm the real options channel (Baker, Bloom, and Davis 
(2016), Gulen and Ion (2016)). For example, Gulen and Ion (2016) argue that firms are more 
likely to delay corporate investment, especially for irreversible investment, since policy 
uncertainty increases the real option value.  
M&As require a large amount of initial capital, thus being considered as irreversible 
investment (Bonaime, Gulen, and Ion (2018)). Based on the real options theory, Nguyen and 
Phan (2017) and Bonaime, Gulen, and Ion (2018) find that the aggregate policy uncertainty is 
negatively related to the likelihood of corporate acquisitions. As the firm-level political risk 
index developed by Hassan et al. (2019) is used as a proxy for a firm’s exposure to economic 
policy uncertainty, the relationship between firm-level political risk and M&A activities should 
be negative. From the arguments above, I form the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: A higher exposure to political risk results in a lower likelihood of corporate 
acquisitions and a lower level of M&A deal value.  
Moreover, based on the real options theory, firms will delay irreversible investment 
before resolving some of the uncertainty (Dixit, Dixit, and Pindyck (1994)). This argument 
implies that even if firms engage in M&As, they still have the incentive to spend more time to 
complete the deals. Therefore, I hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 2: A firm’s exposure to political risk is positively correlated with the time it takes 
to complete M&A deals.  
During the periods of high policy uncertainty, the cost of capital tends to be high, which 
exacerbates firms’ financial constraints (Pastor and Veronesi (2012), Gilchrist, Sim, and 
Zakrajšek (2014)). It is costly and difficult for acquirers to raise external funds to support 
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M&As during such periods (Nguyen and Phan (2017)). Thus, acquirers are expected to be 
prudent in setting the bid price. An abnormally high bid price may result in liquidity problems 
for acquirers, which increases firms’ default risk. Based on the above argument, I form the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: A higher level of a firm’s exposure to political risk results in a lower level of bid 
premiums. 
Policy uncertainty imposes additional risk on firm operations. Acquisitions can be risky 
for firm with a high exposure to political risk, which amplifies and complicates the risk of large 
investment such as M&As (Nguyen and Phan (2017)). However, political risk can motivate a 
firm’s prudence and conservatism (Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen (2007), Gulen and Ion 
(2016)). If acquirers choose to conduct M&As during the high-risk period, the high level of 
political risk can prompt the acquirers to perform thorough due diligence and carefully select 
the acquisition targets. Acquirers tend to select the right M&A deals under high policy 
uncertainty, which creates value for shareholders both in the short term and long term. 
Accordingly, I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 4: A firm’s exposure to political risk is positively associated with the M&A deal 
performance.  
 
4. Data and Methodology  
An overview of the data and methodology employed in this study is given in this section, 
which includes six sub-sections: the first describes the sample selection criteria; the second 
discusses the construction of the main variables; the third and fourth show the econometric 




4.1 Sample Selection  
The merger and acquisitions data are from Thomson Financial’s SDC Database and 
consist of all completed M&A deals in the United States from 2003 to 2017. Following prior 
literature (Nguyen and Phan (2017)), I exclude small transactions with a deal value of less than 
one million US dollars. I require the target to be either a public or a private firm. I also require 
the acquirer to control less than 50% of the target’s ownership before the transaction and 100% 
of the target’s shares after the transaction. Finally, I obtain accounting information from the 
Compustat database and stock price and return information from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) database. The final sample consists of 4,635 transactions (1,935 unique 
acquirers) with an average transaction value of $555.23 million. The firm-level analysis is 
based on 42,004 firm-year observations, obtained from CRSP and Compustat databases. 
 
4.2 Main Variable Measurement  
The primary variable of interest in this study is a firm’s exposure to political risk. I use 
the firm-level political risk index developed by Hassan et al. (2019) to measure a firm’s 
exposure to policy risk. Hassan et al. (2019) employ textual analysis in the transcripts of 
quarterly earnings conference-call to measure the exposure to political risk. They use a pattern-
based sequence-classification method developed in computational linguistics (Song (2008), 
Manning, Raghavan, and Schütze (2010)) to distinguish the political issues from non-political 
issues. Using this approach, they construct the political topic (P) and non-political topic (N) 
training libraries. Each training library is a collection of two-word bigrams (B).  
Further, they count the number of bigrams associated with the discussion of the political 
topic in a set of ten words surrounding a synonym for risk or uncertainty, and divide by the 











                  (1) 
where 1[•] is the indicator function, P\N denotes the bigrams included in P but not N, r 
represents for the synonym of risk or uncertainty. The first two terms in the equation 
(1[b ∈ P\N] × 1[|b − r| < 10]) count the occurrences of bigrams indicating the discussion of 
political topics that occur in proximity to a synonym for risk or uncertainty (within ten words).  
𝑓𝑏,𝑃  is the frequency of bigram b in the political training library. BP  is the total bigrams 
contained in the political training library. The last term in the numerator (
fb,P
BP
 ) weights each 
bigram with a score reflecting how strongly the bigram is related to the discussion of political 
topics. This measurement of political risk is thus a weighted sum of bigrams devoted to risks 
relating to the political topics in the quarterly earnings conference calls.  
Mirroring this approach, Hassan et al. (2019) decompose the firm-level political risk 
index into different topics. To construct the topic-specific training libraries, they rely on 
newspaper articles, speeches, press releases, and bill sponsorships provided by 
OnTheIssues.org. Based on the material provided on the website, they construct training 
libraries (Z) for eight political topics: economic policy & budget, environment, trade, 
institutions & political process, health care, security & defence, tax policy, and technology & 
infrastructure. Similarly, they calculate the share of quarterly earnings conference-call 
transcripts that features significant discussions associated with political issues for each topic T 
using the formula:  
𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝑇 =










          (2) 
where p is the position of the nearest bigram already counted in the measure of overall political 
risk (1), that is, a political bigram which is also close to a synonym for risk and uncertainty. 
Similarly, b and p are weighted with their term frequencies and inverse document frequencies. 
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𝑓𝑏,𝑍 represents the number of libraries in Z that contain bigram b. log(𝑍/𝑓𝑏,𝑍) adjusts each 
bigram’s weighting for the uniqueness of its use to the discussion of a specific topic. The 
purpose of this term is to distinguish between different political topics. For example, a bigram 
that is used exclusively in the discussion of a specific topic is assigned the highest weight of 
log(𝑍/1), while a bigram that occurs in all topic-based political libraries receives a weight of  
log(𝑍/𝑍) = 0 . The topic-based measurements identify transcripts that centre on risks 
associated with each of the eight political topics.  
Furthermore, Hassan et al. (2019) confirm the validity of their measure. They compare 
it with the newspaper-based measure of economic policy uncertainty developed by Baker, 
Bloom, and Davis (2016). The two series are based on very different data sources and 
methodologies, however, they are highly correlated. The correlation between the two 
measurements is 0.82, which suggests that the two series capture many same events driving 
uncertainty about the economic policy. Additionally, Hassan et al. (2019) find a positive and 
significant correlation between firm-level political risk and the sectors’ dependence on  
political decision-making. For example, firms in the finance, insurance, real estate, and 
construction sectors spend the highest proportion of their time discussing risks related to 
political topics, while firms in the retail and trade sectors have the lowest political risk. To 
further probe the firm-level political risk index, Hassan et al. (2019) show that this measure is 
highly correlated with the realized and implied volatility of stock returns. A one-standard-
deviation increase in political risk is associated with a 0.06-standard-deviation increase in the 
firm’s stock return volatility.  
 
4.3 Baseline Model Specification  
The first objective of this paper is to examine how firms’ exposure to political risk 
affects their M&A activities in terms of the M&A likelihood, deal value, and time to 
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completion of M&As. A logistic econometric model is employed to examine the relationship 
between firm-level political risk and the likelihood of corporate acquisitions. In the regression 
model, I control for a set of firm-specific characteristics, which could affect firms’ takeover 
activities. I also include year fixed effects and industry fixed effects to control for the 
unobservable time and industry factors that may affect the probability of corporate acquisitions. 
To define an industry, I use the first two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. 
The logistic regression model is designed as: 
            𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1    
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                          (3) 
where the dependent variable 𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 is an indicator that takes the value of one if a firm 
announces an acquisition in year t+1. All the independent variables are measured at time t. 
𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 is the key interested variable that measures a firm’s exposure to political risk. This 
variable is the average of the transcript-based scores of the overall political risk for a given 
firm and year. Following (Hassan et al. (2019)), I cap 𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡  at the 99
th percentile and 
standardize it by its sample standard deviation. 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡  includes a set of control 
variables that measure firm-specific characteristics in the prior literature (e.g., Ma, Whidbee, 
and Zhang (2019)), such as firm size, Tobin’s Q, leverage, return on assets (ROA), free cash 
flow (FCF), asset tangibility (PP&E) and research and development (R&D) expenditures. 
These firm-level control variables are measured as follows: firm size is the natural logarithm 
of a firm’s total assets; Tobin’s Q is a firm’s market value of equity scaled by its book value 
of equity; leverage is the sum of a firm’s debt divided by its total assets; ROA is a firm’s net 
income scaled by its total assets; FCF is a firm’s net change in cash generated from operating 
activities scaled by its total equity; PP&E is a firm’s property, plant, and equipment divided by 
its total assets; R&D is firm’s research and development expense scaled by its assets. A missing 
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R&D value is coded as 0. These variables are all winsorized at the 1% level. 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 and 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 are year fixed effects and industry fixed effects, while 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term and 
𝛼 is the intercept.  
The coefficient 𝛽1 is the main interest of this study, which measures the effect of a 
firm’s exposure to political risk on M&A likelihood. Hypothesis 1 predicts 𝛽1to be negative, 
that is, a higher firm-level political risk results in a lower likelihood of corporate acquisitions. 
As policy uncertainty is largely idiosyncratic and exhibits substantial firm-level variations, it 
is critical to understand what role firm-level political risk plays in determining corporate 
acquisition activities.   
In another analysis, I examine the effect of political risk on the deal size of M&As using 
an OLS model. Similarly, I control for firm-specific characteristics, year fixed effects and 
industry fixed effects in the analysis. The OLS model is estimated as follows: 
𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                          (4) 
The dependent variable 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1 is the natural logarithm of the aggregate deal 
value for a firm in year t+1. It takes the value of zero if a firm does not conduct any M&As in 
that year. 𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 measures a firm’s exposure to political risk. 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 includes the 
same control variables of firm-specific characteristics as specified in the model (3). The 
coefficient 𝛽1 shows the effect of firm-level political risk on the deal size of M&As, which is 
predicted to be negative under hypothesis 1. The higher a firm’s exposure to political risk, the 




4.4 Deal Level Model Specification 
I further examine the relationship between firm-level political risk and the time to deal 
completion. Using a sample of 4,635 completed M&A deals, I regress the time it takes to 
complete the deal on firm-level political risk and control for firm-specific as well as deal-
specific characteristics in year t. The OLS model is designed as follows:  
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                         (5) 
The independent variable 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗 is the natural logarithm of one plus 
the number of years it takes from the deal announcement in year t+1 to its completion for deal 
j of firm i. All the independent variables are measured in year t. 𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 represents a firm’s 
exposure to political risk. I include the same firm-specific characteristics variables in the 
regression as specified in the model (3). Following the prior literature (e.g., Eckbo, Makaew, 
and Thorburn (2018)), I also control for the deal-specific characteristics in the regression, 
which includes deal value, cash payment indicator, stock payment indicator, public target 
indicator, hostile deal attitude indicator, and tender offer indicator. Those deal characteristics 
are computed as follows: deal value is the natural logarithm of the M&A transaction value as 
reported in the SDC Platinum database, winsorized at the 1% level; cash payment indicator 
takes the value of one if an M&A deal is 100% paid by cash, and zero otherwise; stock payment 
indicator equals one if an M&A deal is 100% paid by stock, and zero otherwise; public target 
indicator equals one if the target is a publicly listed firm, and zero otherwise; hostile deal 
attitude indicator equals one if the deal attitude is identified as hostile in SDC Platinum 
database, and zero otherwise; tender offer is a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if 
the deal is identified as a tender offer, and zero otherwise. 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 and 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 are year 
and industry fixed effects, while 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term and 𝛼 is the intercept.  
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The coefficient 𝛽1 highlights the relationship between firm-level political risk and time 
to deal completion. Based on hypothesis 2, a firm’s exposure to political risk is predicted to be 
positively correlated with the time it takes to complete M&A deals. Thus, I expect 𝛽1 to be 
positive. 
The second objective of this paper is to examine how firms’ exposure to political risk 
affects the outcomes of corporate acquisitions in terms of bid premiums and acquirers’ value 
creation. OLS models are employed to examine these relationships. I regress the bid premiums 
on acquirers’ exposure to political risk while controlling for the firm and deal characteristics 
based on the following model:  
𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑗
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                         (6) 
To measure the dependent variable 𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑠, I use the percentage difference 
between the bid prices and the targets’ stock prices both one week and four weeks before the 
deal announcements in year t+1. I include the same firm-level and deal-level control variables 
as in the model (5). Similarly, I control for the year fixed effects and industry fixed effects. 𝛽1 
measures how an acquirer’s exposure to political risk affects its bid premiums. I expect 𝛽1 to 
be negative based on hypothesis 3.  
Next, I test the relation between firm-level political risk and the value impact of 
acquisitions. To measure the value creation of M&As in the short term, I use the three-day and 
seven-day cumulative abnormal stock returns around M&A announcements. I further use the 
industry adjusted sales growth rate after M&As to measure the value creation of M&As in the 
long term. To analyse the relationship, I construct the following OLS regression model:  
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𝐶𝐴𝑅(−1, +1)𝑖,𝑗  𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝐴𝑅(−3, +3)𝑖,𝑗
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                         (7) 
I use the standard event study methodology to compute the dependent variables (CARs) 
of the sample acquirers over the event window (−1, +1) and (−3, +3)  around the M&A 
announcement dates. The CARs are estimated using the market model, in which the CRSP 
value-weighted index is acting as the benchmark, and the beta coefficients are estimated over 
a period from 220 to 21 days prior to the announcement date. The CARs around the acquisition 
announcement dates are measured as the bidders’ stock returns in excess of those predicted 
value from the market model. Similar to model (5), I include the control variables for firm-
specific and deal-specific characteristics. The coefficient 𝛽1 measures the relationship between 
the acquirers’ short-term stock performance and their exposure to political risk. According to 
hypothesis 4, I predict 𝛽1 to be positive.  
When examining the post-acquisition accounting performance, the following 
regression model is used:  
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1/𝑡+2/𝑡+3
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                         (8) 
The dependent variables, 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒, are acquirers’ one-, two-, and three-
year average industry-adjusted (acquirers’ two-digit SIC codes) sales growth following the 
M&A announcements. Similar controls in the model (5) are considered in this regression model. 




4.5 Endogeneity Problem 
A potential concern is the omitted variables problem. Is there something that is 
correlated with the firm-level political risk that is omitted but also correlated with M&A 
activities? This problem can be mitigated by using two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach 
with valid instrumental variables (Wooldridge (2016)). Followed by Nguyen and Nguyen 
(2019), I use the partisan polarisation measure developed by McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 
(1997) as an instrument for firm-level political risk. It is based on DW-NOMINATE scores to 
track legislators’ ideological positions over time. This measure is calculated by taking the 
difference in the first dimension of the DW-NOMINATE scores between the democratic and 
republican parties. Partisan polarisation leads to a greater variation in policy and policy 
gridlock. Thus, it is likely to be a valid instrument as it is positively related to the firm-level 
political risk but unlikely to be directly linked to M&A activities. I measure the party 
polarisations for the members in the Senate (POLAR) and perform a two-stage regression 
analysis as follows:  
First stage:  
𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                          (9) 
Second stage:  
𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡̂ + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                          (10) 
From the first-stage regression model (model (9)), the significance of the estimated 
coefficient on 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑅𝑡  can indicate whether the IV satisfies the relevance condition. In 
addition, the F-statistic from the model (9) can illustrate whether the relationship between the 
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IV and the endogenous variable is strong or weak (Staiger and Stock (1994), Stock and Yogo 
(2002)). In the second-stage regression (model (10)), the coefficient of 𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡̂  is expected to 
be negative, indicating a negative relationship between the firm-level political risk and M&A 
activities.   
 
4.6 Summary Statistics 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics of Full Sample 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the full sample used in the study. The sample covers publicly 
traded firms in the Compustat and the CRSP databases from 2003 to 2017. After merging with the Hassan et 
al. (2019) firm-level political risk, the final sample consists of 42,004 firm-year observations. All variables are 
defined in the Appendix. PRisk is the proxy for the overall political risk of the firm. Each of the political risks 
is capped at the 99th percentile and standardized by its respective standard deviation. Firm size is in millions of 
dollars. Other key characteristics are winsorized at the 1% level.  
 
Variable Nobs Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev 
PRisk 42,004 0.912 0.598 0.000 5.731 1.000 
Economics Political Risk 42,004 0.845 0.526 0.000 5.987 1.000 
Environment Political Risk 42,004 0.746 0.413 0.000 6.278 1.000 
Trade Political Risk 42,004 0.721 0.391 0.000 6.223 1.000 
Institution Political Risk 42,004 0.772 0.449 0.000 6.125 1.000 
Health Political Risk 42,004 0.696 0.373 0.000 6.573 1.000 
Security Political Risk 42,004 0.818 0.493 0.000 6.009 1.000 
Tax Political Risk 42,004 0.791 0.466 0.000 6.099 1.000 
Technology Political Risk 42,004 0.780 0.455 0.000 6.110 1.000 
Firm Size ($m) 42,004 6.892 6.786 2.638 12.743 2.024 
Tobin’s Q 42,004 1.993 1.526 0.642 8.454 1.380 
Leverage  42,004 0.231 0.192 0.000 0.968 0.223 
ROA 42,004 -0.021 0.032 -1.076 0.270 0.206 
Free Cash Flow 42,004 -0.007 0.034 -1.266 0.617 0.223 
PP&E 42,004 0.482 0.353 0.000 1.869 0.414 
R&D 42,004 0.052 0.000 0.000 0.595 0.103 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the full sample used in this study. The 
sample consists of 42,004 firm-year observations (5,905 unique firms). The average value of 
Hassan et al. (2019) index (i.e., the overall firm-level political risk) is 0.912. The topic-specific 





Table 2. Summary Statistics of M&A Deals 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the M&A deals used in the study. The sample includes 4,635 
completed M&A transactions for US targets by US public acquirers from 2003 to2017. To be included in the 
sample, the acquirer must control less than 50% of the target’s ownership before the transaction and owns 
100% of the target’s shares after the transaction. The deal value must be above 1 million US dollars. Panel A 
lists the distribution of M&As and the deal characteristics by year. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Panel B shows the summary statistics of the political risk for the acquirer. PRisk is the proxy for the overall 
political risk of the firm. Each of the political risks is capped at the 99th percentile and standardized by its 
respective standard deviation.   
 

















All 4,635 555.230 0.537 0.048 0.220 0.001 0.042 0.363 0.451 
2003 266 300.194 0.425 0.117 0.274 0.004 0.045 0.323 0.429 
2004 346 297.022 0.509 0.069 0.220 0.003 0.026 0.347 0.460 
2005 405 563.134 0.511 0.059 0.220 0.002 0.017 0.363 0.457 
2006 408 381.180 0.571 0.039 0.216 0.000 0.015 0.380 0.461 
2007 421 397.808 0.501 0.038 0.209 0.000 0.040 0.349 0.437 
2008 302 323.811 0.550 0.033 0.195 0.000 0.070 0.321 0.394 
2009 227 625.572 0.449 0.079 0.256 0.000 0.066 0.352 0.410 
2010 268 478.729 0.541 0.034 0.250 0.000 0.056 0.347 0.433 
2011 282 437.246 0.507 0.028 0.121 0.000 0.025 0.365 0.461 
2012 331 416.031 0.486 0.030 0.184 0.000 0.033 0.411 0.477 
2013 266 510.728 0.534 0.038 0.207 0.000 0.034 0.365 0.451 
2014 323 707.243 0.486 0.043 0.183 0.000 0.040 0.313 0.415 
2015 299 1,109.321 0.602 0.043 0.254 0.000 0.060 0.368 0.441 
2016 251 1,102.978 0.713 0.036 0.307 0.000 0.084 0.430 0.514 
2017 240 991.126 0.717 0.046 0.242 0.000 0.063 0.429 0.546 
Panel B: Summary of Political Risk 
Variable Nobs Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev 
PRisk  4,635 0.964 0.659 0.000 5.614 1.000 
Economics Political Risk 4,635 0.880 0.567 0.009 5.937 1.000 
Environment Political Risk 4,635 0.784 0.453 0.004 6.157 1.000 
Trade Political Risk 4,635 0.806 0.473 0.000 6.061 1.000 
Institution Political Risk 4,635 0.763 0.442 0.001 6.108 1.000 
Health Political Risk 4,635 0.643 0.328 0.002 6.801 1.000 
Security Political Risk 4,635 0.827 0.498 0.011 5.962 1.000 
Tax Political Risk 4,635 0.817 0.495 0.000 5.981 1.000 
Technology Political Risk 4,635 0.797 0.474 0.000 6.116 1.000 
 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the M&A subsample used in the study. The 
sample includes 4,635 M&A deals from US public acquirers for US public or private targets 
from 2003 to 2017. The distribution of M&As and the deal characteristics by year are reported 
in Panel A. The annual number of M&A deals increases gradually from 2003 to 2007, while 
drops significantly over the period from 2008 to 2010 due to the global financial crisis. The 
average transaction value is 555.23 million US dollars. It increases dramatically after 2012, 
reaching the highest value of 1.1 billion US dollars in 2015. Among all the transactions, around 
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20% of the deals involve public targets. Half of the deals are paid purely in cash. Around 30% 
of the transactions are classified as diversified M&As, which are defined as mergers between 
firms that are operating in different industries.       
Panel B presents the value of the political risk index developed by Hassan et al. (2019), 
the average index value for M&A subsample is 0.964, which is slightly higher than that in the 







Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
 
The table reports the correlation coefficient among the main variables in the study. PRisk is the proxy for the overall political risk of the firm. It is the average 
for a given firm and year of the transcript-based scores of political risks. Panel A reports the correlation coefficient among firm characteristics with political 
risk. Panel B shows the correlation among deal characteristics with political risk. All variables are defined in the Appendix. ***, **, and * indicate significant 
level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
 
Panel A: Correlations with Firm Characteristics (N= 42,004) 
 PRisk Firm Size Tobin’s Q Leverage ROA FCF PP&E R&D 
PRisk  1.000        
Firm Size 0.046*** 1.000       
Tobin’s Q -0.010** -0.245*** 1.000      
Leverage -0.008 0.289*** -0.154*** 1.000     
ROA -0.061*** 0.379*** -0.091*** -0.057*** 1.000    
FCF -0.012** 0.201*** 0.012** -0.081*** 0.442*** 1.000   
PP&E -0.076** 0.151*** -0.161*** 0.254*** 0.022*** -0.095*** 1.000  
R&D 0.040*** -0.424*** 0.373*** -0.189*** -0.610*** -0.270*** -0.196*** 1.000 
 
Panel B: Correlations with Deal Characteristics (N= 4,635) 
 PRisk Deal Value Pure Cash Pure Stock Public Target Hostile Tender Offer 
PRisk 1.000       
Deal Value  0.037 1.000      
Pure Cash  -0.008** -0.018 1.000     
Pure Stock   0.011 0.080*** -0.242*** 1.000    
Public Target  0.016 0.536*** -0.010 0.219*** 1.000   
Hostile -0.004 0.051*** -0.010 -0.006 0.048*** 1.000  




The correlation matrix of the key variables is reported in Table 3. Panel A indicates that 
political risk is negatively related to firm size, Tobin’s Q, ROA, FCF, and PP&E, but it is 
positively related to R&D expenditures. Panel B shows the correlation matrix for the M&A 
subsample. Most of the deal characteristics are unrelated to the political risk except for the cash 
payment indicator, which is negatively related to an acquirer’s exposure to political risk.  
 
5. Empirical Results  
5.1 Baseline Results 
 
Table 4. Political Risk and Acquisition 
 
The table reports the logistic regression results of acquisition likelihood and the OLS regression results of the 
deal value. The dependent variable in the first column is an M&A indicator, which takes the value of one if a 
firm makes at least one M&A announcement in year t+1, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in the 
second column is the aggregate deal value for a firm in year t+1. It takes the value of zero if a firm does not 
conduct M&As. All independent variables are measured at time t. Detailed variable definitions are in the 
Appendix. The sample contains 42,004 firm-year observations from 2003 to 2017. P-value, presented in 
parentheses, is adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Both models control for year fixed 
effects and industry fixed effects using two-digit SIC industry classifications. ***, **, and * indicate significant 
level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
 
 (1) (2) 
Variable  M&As Indicator Deal Value 
PRisk  -0.060*** -0.018** 
 (0.009) (0.025) 
Firm Size 0.113*** 0.106*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q  0.051*** 0.038*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.104 -0.064 
 (0.422) (0.179) 
ROA 1.208*** 0.260*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
FCF 0.351*** 0.051* 
 (0.002) (0.053) 
PP&E -0.605*** -0.190*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D -0.556 0.071 
 (0.158) (0.494) 
Constant -2.456*** -0.090 
 (0.000) (0.755) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes 
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Pseudo R2/R2 0.057 0.036 
No. of obs. 42,004 42,004 
 
Table 4 presents the empirical results of the regression model (3) and (4). The variable 
of interest is 𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘. The dependent variable in the first column is an M&A indicator, which 
takes the value of one if a firm makes at least one M&A announcement in year t+1, and zero 
otherwise. The dependent variable in the second column is the aggregate deal value for a firm 
in year t+1. It equals zero if a firm does not conduct any M&As in the year. The estimated 
coefficients of political risk indicate how a firm’s exposure to political risk affects corporate 
acquisitions. P-values are estimated using robust standard errors to adjust for heteroscedasticity 
(White (1980)), and standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  
Consistent with the first hypothesis, the coefficient of 𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 is negative and significant 
at the 1% level in column (1), which indicates that a firm’s exposure to political risk is 
negatively related to the firm acquisitiveness. One-standard-deviation increase in 𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘  is 
associated with a 63 bps decrease in acquisition probability. This effect is economically 
significant, considering the unconditional M&A probability is only 9.11% in the sample. In 
column (2), the coefficient of 𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 is still negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, 
indicating that the aggregate deal value is negatively correlated with the acquirer’s policy 
uncertainty. Regarding the economic significance, I find that a one-standard-deviation increase 
in 𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 is associated with a $US 7.6 million decrease in average M&A deal value. These 
findings support the real options theory. As higher levels of uncertainty will increase the value 
of the option to delay investment (Abel (1983), Dixit, Dixit, and Pindyck (1994)), firms tend 
to reduce or delay M&As when their exposures to policy uncertainty are high.  
Different types of uncertainty can affect firms in different ways, and thus the impact of 
policy uncertainty on corporate acquisitions may vary depending on the type of policy 
uncertainty. To capture this effect, In Table 5 and Table 6, I perform the same analysis as the 
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baseline models in Table 4, but replace the overall political risk index with the topic-specific 























Table 5. Political Risk by Topic and Acquisition Likelihood 
 
The table reports the logistic regression results of acquisition likelihood on firm political risk by different topics. The dependent variable in all regressions is an M&A 
indicator, which takes the value of one if a firm makes at least one M&A announcement in year t+1, and zero otherwise. The key independent variables are political risks by 
eight separate topics, i.e., economic policy & budget, environment, trade, institutions & political process, health, security & defence, tax policy, and technology & 
infrastructure. All the key independent variables are capped at the 99th percentile and standardized by their respective standard deviation. All independent variables are 
measured at time t. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix. The sample covers publicly traded firms in Compustat and CRSP databases from 2003 to 2017. P-value, 
presented in parentheses, is adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. All regressions control for year fixed effects and industry fixed effects using two-
digit SIC industry classifications. ***, **, and * indicate significant level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.     
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variable  Dependent Variable: M&As Indicator 
Economics Political Risk  -0.059**        
  (0.010)        
Environment Political Risk   -0.042*       
   (0.077)       
Trade Political Risk    -0.092***      
    (0.000)      
Tax Political Risk     -0.043*     
     (0.054)     
Institutions Political Risk      -0.027    
      (0.231)    
Health Political Risk       0.014   
       (0.546)   
Security Political Risk        -0.025  
        (0.239)  
Technology Political Risk         -0.021 
         (0.337) 
Firm Size  0.114*** 0.113*** 0.115*** 0.114*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q   0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Leverage  -0.098 -0.106 -0.109 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100 -0.101 -0.102 
  (0.445) (0.413) (0.399) (0.437) (0.437) (0.438) (0.432) (0.431) 
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ROA  1.212*** 1.212*** 1.206*** 1.218*** 1.216*** 1.224*** 1.216*** 1.218*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FCF  0.354*** 0.351*** 0.352*** 0.353*** 0.352*** 0.350*** 0.352*** 0.351*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
PPE  -0.604*** -0.597*** -0.603*** -0.601*** -0.600*** -0.595*** -0.601*** -0.599*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D  -0.579 -0.569 -0.581 -0.570 -0.559 -0.552 -0.559 -0.555 
  (0.141) (0.149) (0.140) (0.148) (0.155) (0.161) (0.156) (0.159) 
Constant  -2.459*** -2.469*** -2.442*** -2.473*** -2.476*** -2.496*** -2.477*** -2.476*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year FE  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R2  0.057 0.057 0.058 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 
No. of obs.  42,004 42,004 42,004 42,004 42,004 42,004 42,004 42,004 
 
Table 6. Political Risk by Topic and Deal Value 
 
The table reports the OLS regression results of deal value on firm political risk by different topics. The dependent variable in all regressions is the aggregate deal value for a 
firm in year t+1. It takes the value of zero if a firm does not conduct M&As. The key independent variables are political risks by eight separate topics, i.e., economic policy 
& budget, environment, trade, institutions & political process, health, security & defence, tax policy, and technology & infrastructure. All the key independent variables are 
capped at the 99th percentile and standardized by their respective standard deviation. All independent variables are measured at time t. Detailed variable definitions are in the 
Appendix. The sample covers publicly traded firms in Compustat and CRSP databases from 2003 to 2017. P-value, presented in parentheses, is adjusted for heteroscedasticity 
and clustered at the firm level. All regressions control for year fixed effects and industry fixed effects using two-digit SIC industry classifications. ***, **, and * indicate 
significant level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.     
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variable  Dependent Variable: Deal Value 
Economics Political Risk  -0.023***        
  (0.004)        
Environment Political Risk   -0.016**       
   (0.042)       
Trade Political Risk    -0.032***      
    (0.000)      
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Tax Political Risk     -0.014*     
     (0.091)     
Institutions Political Risk      -0.009    
      (0.267)    
Health Political Risk       0.009   
       (0.380)   
Security Political Risk        -0.007  
        (0.401)  
Technology Political Risk         -0.007 
         (0.385) 
Firm Size  0.106*** 0.106*** 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q   0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.062 -0.064 -0.066 -0.063 -0.062 -0.061 -0.062 -0.062 
  (0.188) (0.175) (0.164) (0.185) (0.188) (0.194) (0.187) (0.186) 
ROA  0.260*** 0.260*** 0.257*** 0.262*** 0.263*** 0.267*** 0.263*** 0.263*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FCF  0.052** 0.051* 0.052* 0.052** 0.052* 0.051* 0.052* 0.052* 
  (0.050) (0.054) (0.052) (0.050) (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052) 
PPE  -0.190*** -0.188*** -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.187*** -0.189*** -0.189*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D  0.064 0.065 0.061 0.067 0.068 0.067 0.069 0.069 
  (0.543) (0.535) (0.559) (0.524) (0.512) (0.521) (0.509) (0.509) 
Constant  -0.088 -0.093 -0.084 -0.094 -0.095 -0.102 -0.096 -0.095 
  (0.762) (0.748) (0.772) (0.744) (0.741) (0.721) (0.738) (0.741) 
Year FE  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2  0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 




Table 5 and 6 report the logistics regressions of acquisition likelihood and OLS 
regressions of deal size on topic-specific political risk index, which covers eight areas of 
policies, namely, economic policy & budget, environment, trade, institutions & political 
process, health care, security & defence, tax policy, and technology & infrastructure. The 
regression results show that political risk related to economic policy and budget, environment, 
trade, and tax policy has a significant and negative effect on M&A likelihood and deal value. 
In contrast, the risk associated with institutions and political process, health care, security and 
defence, and technology and infrastructure does not have a meaningful impact on M&A 
activities. These results are intuitive since the key bigrams for economic policy, environment, 
trade, and tax are, in part, related to M&As (e.g., balanced budget, free trade, trade barriers, 
tax relief, bush tax). Thus, these policies play an important role in the execution of M&As. In 
addition, my findings for the topic-specific political risk index are similar to Bonaime, Gulen, 
and Ion (2018). They find that uncertainty related to the fiscal policy and monetary policy has 
a strong negative effect on merger activity, while uncertainty associated with health care and 
national security is not meaningfully correlated with subsequent M&A activity.  
 
5.2 Subsample Analyses  
Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012) find that managers are more risk-averse and tend to 
decrease risky investment when policy uncertainty is high. Thus, policy uncertainty is expected 
to have more pronounced effects on risky M&A activities. Due to the managerial agency 
problem and inefficiency in allocating resources, diversified M&As are risky and viewed 
negatively by the market (Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Scharfstein (1998)). 
Therefore, I predict that the negative effect of political risk on firm acquisitiveness and deal 
value is stronger for diversified M&As.   
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The diversified M&As are identified using the information from the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code and the input-output (I-O) accounts table published by the US Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (BEA). I first use the two-digit SIC codes to identify M&A transactions 
between firms that are operating in different industries. Following the literature (Fan and Goyal 
(2006), Garfinkel and Hankins (2011), Ahern and Harford (2014)), I use the I-O tables to 
further exclude vertical deals1 from the M&A transactions across different industries. To check 
whether the results are sensitive to industry classifications, I also perform the same subsample 





2-digit-SIC  3-digit-SIC 









PRisk -0.127*** -0.026  -0.128*** -0.008 
 (0.001) (0.345)  (0.000) (0.787) 
Firm Size 0.120*** 0.075***  0.103*** 0.081*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q  0.021 0.057***  0.011 0.067*** 
 (0.430) (0.002)  (0.643) (0.001) 
Leverage -0.329* -0.081  -0.444** 0.036 
 (0.098) (0.586)  (0.016) (0.818) 
ROA 1.193*** 1.319***  1.251*** 1.323*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
FCF 0.346** 0.323**  0.418*** 0.261 
 (0.023) (0.039)  (0.004) (0.122) 
PP&E -0.790*** -0.278***  -0.659*** -0.294*** 
 (0.000) (0.006)  (0.000) (0.008) 
R&D -1.167 0.189  -2.271*** 0.813* 
 (0.106) (0.666)  (0.001) (0.066) 
                                                 
1 Using the I-O account tables from the BEA, I estimate the dollar value of the output from the acquirer’s industry 
i required to produce one dollar of output for the target’s industry j, and vice versa. The transactions are classified 
as vertical M&As if either value exceeds 5%. 
Table 7. Political Risk and Diversified M&As Likelihood 
 
The table reports the logistic regression results of diversified M&As likelihood and non-diversified M&As 
likelihood on firm political risk. The dependent variable in column (1) equals one if a bidder and its target have 
different two-digit SIC codes in year t+1, and it is not a vertical M&A identified using the benchmark I-O tables 
published by the BEA. The dependent variable in the second column is a non-diversified M&A indicator, which 
equals one if the transactions are not identified as diversified M&As in year t+1, and zero otherwise. The dependent 
variables in columns (3) and (4) are constructed in the same way as those in columns (1) and (2), except that 
industries are classified using three-digit SIC codes. All independent variables are measured at time t. Detailed 
variable definitions are in the Appendix. The sample covers publicly traded firms in the Compustat and the CRSP 
databases from 2003 to 2017. P-value, presented in parentheses, is adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at 
the firm level.  All regressions control for year fixed effects and industry fixed effects using two-digit SIC industry 




Constant -3.900*** -2.803***  -3.827*** -2.798*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.0499 0.0504  0.0461 0.0526 
No. of obs. 40,960 41,973  41,008 41,973 
 
Table 7 shows the regression results of acquisition likelihood. The dependent variable 
in column (1), Diversified M&As, equals one if the acquirer and its target have different two-
digit SIC codes and the deal is not a vertical M&A verified using the benchmark I-O tables 
published by the BEA, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in column (2), Non-
Diversified M&As, equals one if the transactions are not defined as diversified M&As, and 
zero otherwise. I construct the dependent variables in columns (3) and (4) in the same way as 
those in columns (1) and (2), except that industries are classified using three-digit SIC codes.  
The coefficients of 𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in 
columns (1) and (3), while losing their significance in columns (2) and (4). These findings 
suggest that the decrease in firm acquisitiveness under high policy uncertainty is mainly driven 
by the decrease in the diversified M&As, which is consistent with my prediction that firms tend 





2-digit-SIC  3-digit-SIC 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Diversified M&As 
Deal Value  
Non-Diversified 
M&As Deal Value 
 Diversified M&As 
Deal Value  
Non-Diversified 
M&As Deal Value 
PRisk -0.011*** -0.004  -0.014*** -0.002 
Table 8. Political Risk and Diversified M&As Deal Value 
 
The table reports the OLS regression results of diversified M&As deal value and non-diversified M&As deal value 
on firm political risk. The dependent variable in column (1) is the deal value of diversified M&As for a firm in year 
t+1. It takes the value of zero if a firm does not conduct M&As or diversified M&As in that year. The dependent 
variable in the second column is the deal value of non-diversified M&A for a firm in year t+1. It equals zero if a 
firm does not conduct M&As or non-diversified M&As in that year. The diversified M&As are identified using 
SIC code and I-O accounts table published by the BEA. The dependent variables in columns (3) and (4) are 
constructed in the same way as those in columns (1) and (2), except that industries are classified using three-digit 
SIC codes. All independent variables are measured at time t. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix. The 
sample covers publicly traded firms in the Compustat and the CRSP databases from 2003 to 2017. P-value, 
presented in parentheses, is adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. All regressions control 
for year fixed effects and industry fixed effects using two-digit SIC industry classifications. ***, **, and * indicate 




 (0.000) (0.453)  (0.000) (0.694) 
Firm Size 0.024*** 0.039***  0.030*** 0.033*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q  0.006** 0.022***  0.006** 0.021*** 
 (0.030) (0.000)  (0.048) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.040** -0.012  -0.059*** 0.006 
 (0.033) (0.677)  (0.008) (0.827) 
ROA 0.046*** 0.210***  0.056*** 0.198*** 
 (0.005) (0.000)  (0.005) (0.000) 
FCF 0.014* 0.032*  0.025** 0.021 
 (0.098) (0.092)  (0.025) (0.237) 
PP&E -0.066*** -0.047***  -0.072*** -0.043*** 
 (0.000) (0.009)  (0.000) (0.009) 
R&D -0.012 0.105  -0.071 0.165** 
 (0.774) (0.147)  (0.133) (0.018) 
Constant -0.001 0.079  -0.048 0.128 
 (0.988) (0.608)  (0.530) (0.397) 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES 
R2 0.014 0.019  0.015 0.018 
No. of obs. 42,004 42,004  42,004 42,004 
 
Similarly, I examine the effect of firm-level political risk on M&A deal value for 
diversified M&As and non-diversified M&As, and present the results in Table 8. The 
dependent variable in column (1) is the deal value of diversified M&As for a firm. It takes the 
value of zero if a firm does not make any M&A or diversified M&A in that year. The dependent 
variable in column (2) equals the deal value of non-diversified M&As for a firm in that year, 
and zero otherwise. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variables are constructed in the same 
way as those in columns (1) and (2), except that industries are classified using three-digit SIC 
codes.  
Consistent with the hypothesis that firms tend to decrease the value of risky investment 
when there is a high level of the political risk ,  I find that the coefficients of 𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 are negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (1) and (3), while losing their 
significance in columns (2) and (4). Therefore, the negative effect of firm-level political risk 
on M&A activities is mainly driven by the decrease in risky investment, in particular, 
diversified M&As.  
I further examine whether the negative effect of firm-level political risk on firm 
acquisitiveness and M&A deal value varies across firms with different characteristics. 
46 
 
According to An et al. (2016), the negative effect of political uncertainty on the firm’s corporate 
investment is more pronounced for large and influential firms. Firms that contribute 
significantly to the economy are likely to have political connections. Thus, these firms are more 
affected by policy uncertainty. I use the market share of a firm within its operating industry to 
proxy for the influence, which is the total revenue of a firm divided by the industry total 
revenue (i.e. industry is defined using the first two-digit SIC code) in each year. A firm is 
classified as a dominated firm in an industry if the percentage sales of the firm are higher than 
the industry median percentage.  
 
Table 9. Political Risk and Acquisition Likelihood for Dominate Firms 
 
The table reports the results of subsample analysis based on the market share of a firm using logistic regressions. 
The dependent variable in the first and second columns is an M&A indicator, which takes the value of one if a 
firm makes at least one M&A announcement in year t+1, and zero otherwise. All independent variables are 
measured at time t. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix. The sample contains 41,765 firm-year 
observations from 2003 to 2017. P-value, presented in parentheses, is adjusted for heteroscedasticity and 
clustered at the firm level. All regressions control for year fixed effects and industry fixed effects using two-
digit SIC industry classifications. ***, **, and * indicate significant level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
 
Dependent Variable: M&As Indicator   
Dominate Firm 
 Yes  No Test Difference 
Variable (1) (2) (1)-(2) 
PRisk  -0.079*** -0.026 -0.053* 
 (0.009) (0.440) (0.086) 
Firm Size 0.106*** 0.163***  
 (0.000) (0.000)  
Tobin’s Q  0.049* 0.057***  
 (0.074) (0.004)  
Leverage -0.338* 0.060  
 (0.057) (0.734)  
ROA 1.361*** 0.792***  
 (0.000) (0.000)  
FCF 0.652*** 0.198  
 (0.000) (0.173)  
PP&E -0.641*** -0.551***  
 (0.000) (0.000)  
R&D 1.248* -1.076**  
 (0.055) (0.034)  
Constant -2.380*** -3.066***  
 (0.001) (0.000)  
Year F.E. Yes Yes  
Industry F.E. Yes Yes  
Pseudo R2 0.060 0.062  




Table 9 presents the regression results of the subsample analysis based on firms’ market 
shares and the M&A likelihood. In columns (1) and (2), I decompose my sample according to 
whether a firm’s market share is above or below the industry median. Results show that the 
estimated coefficients for 𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 are only significant for industry-dominated firms, indicating 
that only dominated firms reduce the likelihood of corporate acquisitions when their exposures 
to political risk are high. The coefficient difference between these two groups is significant at 
the 10% level.  
 
Table 10. Political Risk and Deal Value for Dominate Firms 
 
The table reports the results of subsample analysis based on the market share of a firm using OLS regressions. 
The dependent variable in the first and second columns is the aggregate deal value for a firm in year t+1. It takes 
the value of zero if a firm does not conduct M&As. All independent variables are measured at time t. Detailed 
variable definitions are in the Appendix. The sample contains 42,004 firm-year observations from 2003 to 2017. 
P-value, presented in parentheses, is adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. All 
regressions control for year fixed effects and industry fixed effects using two-digit SIC industry classifications. 
***, **, and * indicate significant level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
 
Dependent Variable: Deal Value 
Dominate Firm 
 Yes  No Test Difference 
Variable (1) (2) (1)-(2) 
PRisk  -0.033** -0.003 -0.030* 
 (0.018) (0.700) (0.063) 
Firm Size 0.129*** 0.080***  
 (0.000) (0.000)  
Tobin’s Q  0.055*** 0.025***  
 (0.002) (0.000)  
Leverage -0.170** 0.016  
 (0.044) (0.723)  
ROA 0.512*** 0.134***  
 (0.000) (0.001)  
FCF 0.162*** 0.026  
 (0.002) (0.346)  
PP&E -0.267*** -0.123***  
 (0.000) (0.000)  
R&D 0.903** -0.027  
 (0.022) (0.750)  
Constant -0.121 -0.141  
 (0.794) (0.373)  
Year F.E. Yes Yes  
Industry F.E. Yes Yes  
R2 0.036 0.031  




Similarly, Table 10 provides empirical evidence on the market share of a firm and 
M&A deal value. The results show that only the industry-dominated firms reduce the aggregate 
deal value during the periods of high political risk. I also test the coefficient difference between 
dominated firms and non-dominated firms. The difference between these two groups is 
significant at the 10% level. Consistent with An et al. (2016), large and influential firms are 
more affected by policy uncertainty, and thus the negative effect of political risk on the firm’s 
corporate investment is more pronounced.  
 
5.3 Deal Level Analyses 
 
Table 11. Political Risk and Time to Completion of M&As 
 
The table reports the OLS regression results of the time to completion of M&A deals. The dependent variable in 
the first column is the number of years from an M&A deal announcement to its completions for a given deal in 
year t+1. The dependent variable in the second column is the natural logarithm of 1 plus the time to completion in 
column 1. All independent variables are measured at time t. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix. The 
sample covers 4,635 completed M&A bids for US targets by US public bidders from 2003 to 2017. P-value, 
presented in parentheses, is adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. All regressions control 
for year fixed effects and industry fixed effects using two-digit SIC industry classifications. ***, **, and * indicate 
significant level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
Variable Time to Completion  Ln (1+Time to Completion) 
PRisk  0.009** 0.006** 
 (0.016) (0.011) 
Firm Size -0.005* -0.005*** 
 (0.072) (0.003) 
Tobin’s Q  -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.344) (0.200) 
Leverage -0.030 -0.024* 
 (0.176) (0.082) 
ROA 0.019 -0.002 
 (0.574) (0.913) 
FCF -0.119*** -0.072*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
PP&E 0.030** 0.023*** 
 (0.019) (0.007) 
R&D 0.076 0.046 
 (0.271) (0.289) 
Deal Value  0.037*** 0.030*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Pure Cash  -0.028*** -0.021*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Pure Stock   0.078*** 0.058*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Target  0.175*** 0.140*** 
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 (0.000) (0.000) 
Hostile 0.859*** 0.495*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Tender Offer -0.156*** -0.111*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.194*** 0.189*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Year F.E. Yes  Yes  
Industry F.E. Yes  Yes 
R2 0.330 0.449 
No. of obs. 4,635 4,635 
 
Next, I examine the relationship between firm-level political risk and the time to deal 
completion by estimating model (5) and report the results in Table 11. The dependent variable 
in column (1) is the number of years from an M&A deal announcement to its deal completion. 
The dependent variable in column (2) is the natural logarithm of 1 plus the time to completion 
in column (1). I run OLS regressions using a sample of 4,635 completed M&A deals, and find 
that the coefficients of 𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 are positive and significant at the 5% level in both columns (1) 
and (2). Supporting hypothesis 2, these findings show that firms tend to delay irreversible 
investment before resolving some of the uncertainty, and thus, even if firms already engage in 
M&As during the periods of high political risk, they still have the incentive to spend more time 
to complete the deals.  
 
Table 12. Political Risk and Bid Premiums 
 
The table reports the OLS regression results of bid premiums on the level of firm political risk. The dependent 
variable in the first (second) column is the percentage difference between the bid prices and the targets’ stock 
prices one week (four weeks) before the deal announcements in year t+1. All independent variables are 
measured at time t. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix. The sample covers 947 completed M&A 
bids for US public targets by US public bidders from 2003 to 2017. P-value, presented in parentheses, is adjusted 
for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. All regressions control for year fixed effects and industry 
fixed effects using two-digit SIC industry classifications. ***, **, and * indicate significant level at the 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
Variable Bid Premiums 1 Week Bid Premiums 4 Week 
PRisk -0.022 -0.036** 
 (0.134) (0.042) 
Firm Size 0.034*** 0.052*** 
 (0.005) (0.001) 
Tobin’s Q  0.014 0.019 
 (0.347) (0.203) 
Leverage -0.061 -0.037 
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 (0.506) (0.752) 
ROA -0.082 -0.141 
 (0.684) (0.530) 
FCF 0.296* 0.441* 
 (0.087) (0.061) 
PP&E 0.034 0.028 
 (0.485) (0.582) 
R&D 0.836** 0.717** 
 (0.030) (0.046) 
Deal Value  -0.053*** -0.066*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Pure Cash  0.058 0.017 
 (0.100) (0.690) 
Pure Stock   -0.047 -0.022 
 (0.234) (0.713) 
Hostile 0.620*** 0.205** 
 (0.001) (0.012) 
Tender Offer 0.038 0.076* 
 (0.294) (0.064) 
Constant 0.390*** 0.408** 
 (0.002) (0.018) 
Year F.E. Yes  Yes  
Industry F.E. Yes  Yes 
R2 0.182 0.200 
No. of obs. 947 947 
 
In another analysis, I examine whether firms’ exposure to political risk affects the 
outcomes of M&As. Previous literature shows that policy uncertainty motivates prudence and 
conservatism (Nguyen and Phan (2017)) in firms’ investment behaviours. Accordingly, 
acquirers are reluctant to pay bid premiums, and they are likely to choose to pursue M&A deals 
that have better-expected outcomes. Table 12 reports the OLS regression results of bid 
premiums that acquirers paid in M&As on their exposure to political risk. The dependent 
variable in column (1) (column (2)) is the percentage difference between the bid prices and the 
targets’ stock prices one week (four weeks) before the deal announcements, as specified in the 
SDC database. The coefficient of 𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 is negative but insignificant in column (1). In column 
(2), the coefficient of 𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting 
that deal premiums are negatively correlated with the acquirer’s policy uncertainty. The 
findings in Table 12 are consistent with hypothesis 3, that acquirers’ exposure to political risk 




Table 13. Political Risk and Acquirer CARs 
 
The table reports the OLS regression results of acquirer announcement returns on the level of firm political risk. 
Acquirer announcement returns are measured using acquirers’ 3-day cumulative returns (i.e., CAR (-1,+1)) in 
column (1) and 7-day cumulative returns (i.e., CAR(-3,+3)) in column (2), net the return on the value-weighted 
CRSP index over the same period. All independent variables are measured at time t. Detailed variable definitions 
are in the Appendix. The sample covers 4,492 completed M&A bids for US targets by US public bidders from 
2003 to 2017. P-value, presented in parentheses, is adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. 
All regressions control for year fixed effects and industry fixed effects using two-digit SIC industry classifications. 
***, **, and * indicate significant level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
Variable CAR(-1,+1) CAR(-3,+3) 
PRisk 0.002* 0.003*** 
 (0.098) (0.007) 
Firm Size -0.004*** -0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q  -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.685) (0.283) 
Leverage 0.013** 0.015** 
 (0.029) (0.047) 
ROA -0.005 0.007 
 (0.673) (0.636) 
FCF 0.004 0.002 
 (0.588) (0.787) 
PP&E 0.005 0.001 
 (0.174) (0.909) 
R&D -0.079*** -0.086*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) 
Deal Value  0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.015) (0.012) 
Pure Cash  0.002 0.001 
 (0.228) (0.812) 
Pure Stock   -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.478) (0.464) 
Public Target  -0.012*** -0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) 
Hostile 0.028 0.009 
 (0.488) (0.615) 
Tender Offer 0.004 0.005 
 (0.442) (0.306) 
Constant 0.040*** 0.089*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Year F.E. Yes  Yes  
Industry F.E. Yes  Yes 
R2 0.052 0.047 
No. of obs. 4,492 4,492 
 
Further, I examine how acquirers’ exposure to political risk influences the short-term 
performance of acquisitions. Table 13 reports the OLS regression results of acquirer 
announcement returns on firm’s political risk. Acquirer announcement returns are measured 
using 3-day cumulative abnormal returns (i.e., CAR (-1,+1)) in column (1) and 7-day 
cumulative abnormal returns (i.e., CAR(-3,+3)) in column (2). The coefficients of 𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 are 
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positive and significant at the 10% and 1% level for the event window (−1, +1) and (−3, +3) 
respectively. This positive association is consistent with hypothesis 4, suggesting that when 
firms’ exposures to political risk are high, their M&As create value for shareholders. 
 
Table 14. Political Risk and Acquirer Sales Growth 
 
The table reports the OLS regression results of post-acquisition sales growth on the level of firm political risk. 
The dependent variables are acquirers’ one-, two-, and three-year average industry-adjusted sales growth 
following the M&A announcement. All independent variables are measured at time t. Detailed variable 
definitions are in the Appendix. The sample covers 4,385 completed M&A bids for US targets by US public 
bidders from 2003 to 2017. P-value, presented in parentheses, is adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at 
the firm level. All regressions control for year fixed effects and industry fixed effects using two-digit SIC 
industry classifications. ***, **, and * indicate significant level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Industry Adjusted Sales Growth 
 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
PRisk 0.118*** 0.082** 0.080** 
 (0.008) (0.032) (0.024) 
Firm Size -0.095*** -0.068*** -0.051** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.023) 
Tobin’s Q  -0.025 -0.041 -0.061* 
 (0.534) (0.247) (0.100) 
Leverage 0.140 0.098 0.021 
 (0.574) (0.616) (0.913) 
ROA 0.206 0.438 0.297 
 (0.656) (0.194) (0.347) 
FCF 0.089 -0.205* -0.154 
 (0.562) (0.093) (0.233) 
PP&E -0.140 0.079 0.066 
 (0.435) (0.583) (0.641) 
R&D -0.544 0.947 1.445** 
 (0.504) (0.164) (0.028) 
Deal Value  0.053* 0.039 0.033 
 (0.080) (0.107) (0.142) 
Pure Cash  -0.069 0.003 0.055 
 (0.385) (0.966) (0.350) 
Pure Stock   0.335** 0.141 0.165 
 (0.026) (0.363) (0.232) 
Public Target  -0.091 -0.178* -0.197** 
 (0.484) (0.087) (0.040) 
Hostile 0.309 0.455*** 0.468** 
 (0.170) (0.004) (0.020) 
Tender Offer -0.031 0.046 0.054 
 (0.897) (0.808) (0.760) 
Constant 0.222 -0.079 0.102 
 (0.486) (0.744) (0.693) 
Year F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry F.E.  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.246 0.351 0.390 




To further explore the relationship between a firm’s exposure to political risk and 
M&As outcomes, I examine the acquirers’ long-term performance. Table 14 presents the OLS 
regression results of post-acquisition sales growth on acquirers’ exposure to political risk. The 
dependent variables are acquirers’ one-, two-, and three-year average industry-adjusted sales 
growth following the M&As announcements. I find that the coefficients of 𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 are positive 
and significant at the 5% level or above across all the regressions, which provides strong 
support to hypothesis 4.  
 
Table 15. Political Risk and Acquirer ROA (Propensity Score Matched Sample) 
 
The table reports the OLS regression results of post-acquisition ROA on the level of firm political risk based on 
a propensity-score matched sample. I pair-match firms that make at least one M&A announcement in a given 
year (the treatment group) to those with similar characteristics that do not conduct any M&A (the control group). 
The dependent variables are firms’ one-, two-, and three-year average industry-adjusted ROA. All independent 
variables are measured at time t. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix. P-value, presented in 
parentheses, is adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. All regressions control for year 
fixed effects and industry fixed effects using two-digit SIC industry classifications. ***, **, and * indicate 
significant level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Industry Adjusted ROA 
 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
PRisk 0.303*** 0.159* 0.122* 
 (0.005) (0.061) (0.080) 
Firm Size 0.024 0.049 0.077 
 (0.660) (0.316) (0.108) 
Tobin’s Q  0.019 0.053 0.037 
 (0.783) (0.410) (0.594) 
Leverage -0.497 -0.353 -0.353 
 (0.199) (0.359) (0.328) 
ROA 0.738 -0.392 -0.941 
 (0.258) (0.545) (0.184) 
FCF -0.543 -0.579 -0.356 
 (0.248) (0.100) (0.303) 
PP&E -0.088 -0.281 -0.398* 
 (0.708) (0.213) (0.076) 
R&D -1.558 0.194 0.747 
 (0.426) (0.910) (0.651) 
Deal Value  -0.079 -0.058 -0.091* 
 (0.147) (0.263) (0.077) 
Pure Cash  0.089 0.086 0.043 
 (0.529) (0.532) (0.757) 
Pure Stock   0.341 -0.074 0.278 
 (0.390) (0.819) (0.355) 
Public Target  0.222 0.028 0.106 
 (0.319) (0.892) (0.611) 
Hostile 6.503 3.649 2.460* 
 (0.176) (0.114) (0.056) 
Tender Offer -0.412 -0.409 -0.565* 
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 (0.259) (0.199) (0.065) 
Constant 0.145 0.397 0.321 
 (0.800) (0.485) (0.619) 
Year F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry F.E.  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.220 0.289 0.340 
No. of obs. 4,280 4,280 4,280 
 
Additionally, I examine how acquirers’ political risk affects their operating 
performance after the M&As, using a propensity-score matched sample. Firstly, I pair-match 
firms that make at least one M&A announcement in a given year (the treatment group) to those 
that do not conduct any M&A (the control group). Using a caliper of 0.01, the matching process 
ensures that the treatment group and the control group are similar in terms of firm size, Tobin’s 
Q, leverage, ROA, FCF, PP&E, and R&D expenditures. The dependent variables are firms’ 
one-, two-, and three-year average industry-adjusted ROA during the post-acquisition periods. 
Consistently, I find a positive relationship between firms’ political risk and their industry-
adjusted ROA across all the regressions in table 15. The regression results show that political 
risk motivates the acquirers to perform due diligence in screening the targets and select the 
right M&A deals that create value for acquirers in the long term.  
 
5.4 Instrumental Variable Approach  
Last, I perform a 2SLS regression analysis to address the endogeneity issue. Similar to 
Nguyen and Nguyen (2019), I use the party polarisations for the members in the Senate 
(POLAR) as an instrument variable. The results from the first-stage regression suggest that this 
instrument variable satisfies the relevance requirement. Further, there is no previous study 
documenting a direct link between the party polarisations and M&As activities, which suggests 
that this instrument also meet the exclusion restriction requirement.  
 
Table 16. 2SLS Regressions and M&A Likelihood 
 
The table reports the 2SLS regression results. Firm-level political risk is the endogenous variable. The party 
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polarisations for the members in the Senate (POLAR) is the instrument. Column (1) presents the first-stage 
regression, and column (2) presents the second-stage regression. The dependent variable in the second column is 
an M&A indicator, which takes the value of one if a firm makes at least one M&A announcement in year t+1, and 
zero otherwise. All independent variables are measured at time t. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
The sample contains 42,004 firm-year observations from 2003 to 2017. P-value, presented in parentheses, is 
adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. All regressions control for the industry fixed effects 
using two-digit SIC industry classifications. ***, **, and * indicate significant level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively.   
 
 (1) (2) 
Variable First Stage  M&As Indicator   
POLAR 0.171**  
 (0.029)  
PRisk (Instrumented)  -1.053*** 
  (0.000) 
Firm Size 0.019*** 0.028*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q  -0.008** -0.004 
 (0.027) (0.433) 
Leverage -0.103*** -0.129*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -0.276*** -0.181*** 
 (0.000) (0.007) 
FCF 0.017 0.045 
 (0.457) (0.119) 
PP&E -0.098*** -0.151*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D 0.106 0.050 
 (0.121) (0.547) 
Constant 0.554*** 0.482** 
 (0.000) (0.024) 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes 
F-statistic  55.42  
No. of obs. 42,004 42,004 
 
Table 17. 2SLS Regressions and Deal Value 
 
The table reports the 2SLS regression results. Firm-level political risk is the endogenous variable. The party 
polarisations for the members in the Senate (POLAR) is the instrument. Column (1) presents the first-stage 
regression, and column (2) presents the second-stage regression. The dependent variable in the second column 
is the aggregate deal value for a firm in year t+1. It takes the value of zero if a firm does not conduct M&As. 
All independent variables are measured at time t. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix. The sample 
contains 42,004 firm-year observations from 2003 to 2017. P-value, presented in parentheses, is adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. All regressions control for the industry fixed effects using two-
digit SIC industry classifications. ***, **, and * indicate significant level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
 
 (1) (2) 
Variable First Stage  Deal Value 
POLAR 0.172**  
 (0.028)  
PRisk (Instrumented)  -3.084** 
  (0.046) 
Firm Size 0.019*** 0.142*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q  -0.008** 0.007 
 (0.036) (0.672) 
Leverage -0.103*** -0.405** 
 (0.000) (0.020) 
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ROA -0.276*** -0.573 
 (0.000) (0.197) 
FCF 0.017 0.101 
 (0.519) (0.248) 
PP&E -0.098*** -0.469*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) 
R&D 0.106 0.359 
 (0.143) (0.220) 
Constant 0.554*** 2.030* 
 (0.000) (0.064) 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes 
F-statistic  49.99  
No. of obs. 42,004 42,004 
 
Table 16 and 17 present the 2SLS regression results. The column (1) in each table 
reports the first-stage regression results. In the first stage, I regress the firm-level political risk 
on the instrument variable, party polarisations for members in the Senate, and control for the 
firm-specific characteristics. Consistent with the expectation, the coefficients of the IV are 
significant at the 5% level. These results indicate a strong relevance between the IV and the 
endogenous variable. In addition, the IV is not a weak instrument regarding the F-statistic from 
the first-stage regressions. The F-statistic is 55.42 and 49.99, respectively, which is greater than 
10 (Staiger and Stock (1994)).  
 The column (2) in table 16 shows the second-stage regression results using the M&As 
indicator as the dependent variable. The coefficient of the instrumented 𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting a negative relationship between the firm-
level political risk and the firm acquisitiveness. The dependent variable in table 17 column (2) 
is the aggregate deal value. Consistent with the findings for the baseline model, the coefficients 
of the instrumented 𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 are still negative and statistically significant at the 5% level.  
 In summary, the results using a 2SLS regression analysis is consistent with those from 
the baseline model, which indicates that there is a negative causal relationship between a firm’s 
exposure to political risk and the M&A activities. 
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6. Conclusion  
In this study, I examine the effect of firm-level political risk on M&As. I use the firm-
level political risk index developed by Hassan et al. (2019) to measure a firm’s exposure to 
political risk. This index is based on a firm’s quarterly earnings conference-call transcripts that 
centre on risk related to political matters. The baseline results show that a firm’s exposure to 
political risk is negatively related to the likelihood of corporate acquisitions and M&A deal 
value, which is consistent with the real options theory. From the real options perspective, firms 
are more likely to delay or reduce corporate investment since policy uncertainty increases the 
real option value.  
Moreover, the impact of political risk on corporate acquisitions is dependent on the type 
of political risk, the type of acquisition deals and the market share of a firm. Political risk 
related to economic policy and budget, environment, trade, and tax policy has a significant and 
negative effect on the probability and deal value of M&As. In addition, I find that the negative 
impact of political risk on firm acquisitiveness and deal value is mainly driven by the decrease 
in diversified M&A deals. Furthermore, large and influential firms are more affected by policy 
uncertainty, and thus the negative effect of political risk on the firm’s M&A activities is more 
pronounced.   
Using the sample of M&As transactions, I further examine the relationship between the 
firm-level political risk and the outcome of M&As. Acquirers pay lower bid premiums during 
the periods of high political risk. Additionally, I find that a firm’s exposure to political risk is 
positively associated with the M&A deal performance, proxied by the cumulative abnormal 
stock returns around M&A announcements and acquirers’ long-term performance. This 
positive relationship is attributable to acquirers’ prudence and conservatism in setting the bid 
price and selecting the targets.  
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My thesis makes several main contributions to the literature. First, my study adds to the 
literature examining the effects of policy uncertainty on economic outcomes. It confirms that 
the political risk has value implications and can influence corporate investment. Second, my 
study identifies an additional firm-level attribute, political risk, which can yield significant 
impacts on firms’ M&As. Compared to the political risk at the aggregate level, examining the 
political risk at the firm-level allows us to consider the firm’s relative position in the cross-
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Appendix. Definitions of Variables  
 
This table describes the variables in this paper. Panel A, B, C, and D present firm 




Panel A: Firm Characteristics 
Firm Size Natural logarithm of total assets (in Compustat codes: “at”).  
Tobin’s Q The firm’s market-to-book, defined in Compustat codes as 
“(prcc_f*csho+ lt )/(ceq +lt).” 
Leverage The firm’s financial leverage, defined as its debt divided by its assets 
(in Compustat codes: “(dltt+dlc)/at”). 
ROA The firm’s return on assets, defined as the net income scaled by total 
assets (in Compustat codes:“ni/at”).  
FCF The firm’s net change in cash from operating activities minus capital 
expenditures, scaled by the market value of equity (in Compustat 
codes: “(oancf- capx)/prcc_f*csho”). 
PP&E The firm’s property, plant, and equipment (Compustat: “ppegt”) scaled 
by its assets (Compustat: “at”). 
R&D The firm’s research and development expense (Compustat: “xrd”) 
scaled by its assets (Compustat: “at”). Zero if the figure is missing.  
Panel B: Deal Characteristics 
Deal Value  Natural logarithm of deal value, as reported in SDC Platinum. 
Pure Cash  Dummy variable equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash, and zero 
otherwise.  
Pure Stock  Dummy variable equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock, and zero 
otherwise. 
Public Target Dummy variable equals one if the target is a publicly listed firm, and 
zero otherwise. 
Hostile Dummy variable equals one if the deal attitude is identified as hostile, 
as reported in SDC Platinum, and zero otherwise. 
Tender Offer Dummy variable equals one if the deal is identified as a tender offer, 
as reported in SDC Platinum, and zero otherwise. 
Panel C: Dependent Variables  
M&A Indicator  Dummy variable equals one if a firm makes at least one M&A 
announcement, and zero otherwise. 
Diversified 
M&A_SIC2 
Dummy variable equals one if the acquirer and the target have different 
first two-digit SIC codes and it is not a vertical M&A identified using 
the benchmark I-O tables published by the BEA, and zero otherwise.   
Non-Diversified 
M&As_SIC2 
Dummy variable equals one if the transactions are not identified as 
diversified M&As using the first two-digit SIC codes and the 
benchmark I-O tables published by the BEA, and zero otherwise.  
Diversified 
M&A_SIC3 
Dummy variable equals one if the acquirer and the target have different 
first three-digit SIC codes and it is not a vertical M&A identified using 





Dummy variable equals one if the transactions are not identified as 
diversified M&As using the first three-digit SIC codes and the 




Deal value of diversified M&As (2-digit SIC code) for a firm. It 





Deal value of non-diversified M&As (2-digit SIC code) for a firm. It 
equals zero if a firm does not conduct M&As or non-diversified 




Deal value of diversified M&As (3-digit SIC code) for a firm. It 





Deal value of non-diversified M&As (3-digit SIC code) for a firm. It 
equals zero if a firm does not conduct M&As or non-diversified 
M&As in that year. 
Time to 
Completion  
Number of years from an M&A deal announcement to its completions 
for a given deal.  
CAR (-1,1) Three-day cumulative abnormal return around M&A announcements 
calculated using the standard market-adjusted return model, where the 
abnormal return is calculated as the difference between a bidder’s stock 
return and the value-weighted market index return from the CRSP 
database. The model parameters are estimated over the (-220,-21) 
period before the announcement.  
CAR (-3,3) Seven-day cumulative abnormal return around M&A announcements 
calculated using the standard market-adjusted return model, where the 
abnormal return is calculated as the difference between a bidder’s stock 
return and the value-weighted market index return from the CRSP 
database. The model parameters are estimated over the (-220,-21) 
period before the announcement. 
Bid Premiums 1 
Week 
Percentage difference between the offer prices and the targets’ stock 
prices one week before the deal announcements, as reported in the SDC 
Platinum database.  
Bid Premiums 4 
Week 
Percentage difference between the offer prices and the targets’ stock 
prices four weeks before the deal announcements, as reported in the 
SDC Platinum database. 
Industry Adjusted 
Sales Growth 
Difference in percentage change in sales between a firm and its 




Difference in ROA between a firm and its corresponding industry 
identified using two-digit SIC industry classifications. 
Panel D: Main Independent Variable 
PRisk  Average of the transcript-based scores of the overall political risk 
(Hassan et al. (2019)) for a given firm and year. It is capped at the 99th 
percentile and standardized by its respective standard deviation. 
 
